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majority rule in this country. 4 However, even if it seems
far fetched to call these oral agreements attempts to create
easements which fail because of the Statute of Frauds,
especially in those cases where an agreement in writing
was asked for and refused, 5 yet the vast majority of cases,
where there has been open and continuous use for the
prescriptive period under such an oral agreement, have
refused to hold that the use was merely permissive and
revocable.
JOHN C. ELDRIDGE
The Power Of Equity To Bind Unborn Persons
To A 'Sale For Partition
Hardy v. Leager1
The complainant-appellee and his sister had been ten-
ants in common in the fee of certain realty. Subsequently
the complainant's sister died, devising to complainant a
life estate in all of her property with the remainder, after
the satisfaction of certain pecuniary bequests, in equal
shares to the complainant's surviving children or, upon
failure of such survivors, over, in equal shares, to such
children of certain named cousins as should survive the
complainant. Thus the complainant became the owner in
fee of a one-half undivided interest in the land with a life
" Some cases have confused the rule that use under a void parol grant is
under a claim of right and may ripen into an easement by prescription, with
the minority rule in this country that where the licensee has spent money
or labor in the exercise of his license, the licensor Is estopped from revok-
ing it. In Gyra v. Windler, 40 Colo. 366, 91 P. 36, 37 (1907), where there was
a claimed parol gift to use a right of way, which continued for the prescrip-
tive period, the court said:
"The following appears to be the rule in such cases: 'But though a
right of way cannot be gained by the parol agreement of him who
creates it, yet where, under such agreement, the owner of the dominant
estate used the way thus created for 20 years, -and the same was
acquiesced in by the owner of the servient estate, It was held to be
such an exercise of the way, under a claim of right, as to gain thereby
a prescriptive right to the same'."
Then, the court, without apparently realizing It is announcing two dif-
ferent rules, states, p. 38:
"While a parol license to enter upon real estate is generally revocable
at the pleasure of the licensor, it is settled that such license cannot
be revoked when the licensee, on the faith of the license, with the
knowledge of the licensor, has expended his money and labor In carry-
ing out the object of the license. This is on the principle of estoppel'."
Blaine v. Ray, 61 Vt. 566, 18 A. 189 (1889) ; Morrison v. Fellman, 150
Misc. 772, 271 N. Y. S. 436 (1934).
2212 Md. 565, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957).
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estate in the other half subject to a contingent remainder
in alternative classes of persons.
The complainant filed a bill praying for a sale for par-
tition and for other relief. The only ground averred for the
relief prayed was that the land could not be divided in kind
without loss or injury to the parties. The trial court de-
creed a sale. At the date of the decree all living persons
in interest were parties to the cause including living infant
members of each of the alternative classes. The infants
were represented by duly appointed guardians ad litem.
The purchaser-appellant excepted to the sale urging that:
1. Under Section 170 of Article 16 of the Maryland
Code2 a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to
decree a sale binding on possible after-born remaind-
ermen, and;
2. Section 264 of Article 16 of the Maryland Code8 was
not complied with as there was neither an allegation
nor affirmative proof that the sale was advantageous
to the parties concerned.
'Now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §154:
"The court may decree a partition of any lands, tenements or heredi-
taments, or any right, interest or estate therein, either legal or equi-
table, on the bill or petition of any joint tenant, tenant in common,
or any parcener or any concurrent owner, whether claiming by de-
scent or purchase, or if it appear that said lands, tenements or heredi-
taments, or right, interest or estate thereon cannot be divided without
lose or injury to the parties interested, the court may decree a sale
thereof, and a division of the money arising from such sale among
the parties, according to their respective rights; this section to apply
to cases where all the parties are of full age and to cases where all
the parties are infants, and to cases where some of the parties are of
full age and some infants, . .. , and if any contract hath been made
for the sale of any lands, tenements or hereditaments held as afore-
said, or any interest therein for or on behalf of any infant .... which
the court, upon hearing aforesaid and examination into all the cir-
cumstances, shall think for the interest and advantages, both of such
Infant, . . . and of the other person or persons interested therein to
be confirmed, the court may confirm such contract, and all sales and
deeds made in pursuance of and agreeably to an order of the court
in the exercise of the above power shall be good and sufficient in law
to transfer the estate and interest of such infant,..
Now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §167:
"In all cases when one or more persons is or are entitled to an estate
for life or years or to an estate tail, fee simple, conditional, base or
qualified fee, or any other particular, limited or conditional estate in
lands, and any person or persons is or are entitled to a remainder or
remainders, vested or contingent, or an executory devise or devises,
or any other interest, vested or contingent in the same land, on appli-
cation of any of the parties in interest, a court of equity may, if all
the parties in being are parties to the proceeding, decree a sale or lease
thereof, if it shall appear to be advantageous to the parties concerned,
and shall direct the investment of the proceeds of sale or the limita-
tions of the reversion and rent, as the case may be, so as to inure in
like manner as by the original grant to the use of the same parties
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The lower court overruled these exceptions and confirmed
the sale.
On appeal, the case was remanded to permit compliance
with Section 264 (now 167). The Court of Appeals rejected
the complainant's contention that irrespective of Section
264 (now 167) the modem case law doctrine of virtual
representation would bind after-born persons to the sale.
Although the bill of complaint failed to allege advantage
to all parties concerned, the Chancellor found such benefit
in fact. However, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to
accept this finding as a sufficient compliance with the re-
quirement of Section 264 (now 167) that the proof show
that the sale will be "'advantageous to the parties con-
cerned'."4
At early common law and in Maryland today, a tenant
in common or joint tenant of real property has a right to
partition in kind.5 Though partition was by statute an
action at law, the Court of High Chancery took jurisdiction
because the legal remedy was difficult to obtain.' The
possibility of inconvenience and dissention arising from
cotenancy of land were considered inimical to its full en-
joyment, and thus owners were granted a right to enjoy-
ment in severalty.7 The right was held to be absolute, and
resulting inconvenience to the other cotenants was not a
bar.8 In cases where the land could not be partitioned with-
out loss or injury to the parties in interest, the courts were
powerless to decree sales and divide the proceeds.9 It was
to remedy this situation that Article 16, Section 170 (now
who would be entitled to the land sold or leased, and all such decrees,
if all the persons or parties who would be entitled if the contingency
had happened at the date of the decree, shall bind all persons whether
in being or not, who claim or may claim any interest in said land under
any of the parties to said decree, or under any person from whom
any of the parties to such decree claim, or from or under or by the
original deed or will by which such particular, limited or conditional
estates, with remainders or executory devises, were created."
EDIToR's NoTE: The above statutes will be referred to hereinafter by
their 1957 Code section numbers.
'Supra, n. 1, 573.
631 Hen. VII c. 1 (1539), 1 ALEX. BRIT. STAT. (2nd ed. 1912) 407; 32 Hen.
VIII c. 32 (1540), 1 ALEX. BRT. STAT. 438 (2nd ed. 1912) ; 8 and 9 Win. III,
c. 31 (1697), 2 ALEx. BuT. STAT. (2nd ed. 1912) 834; of. Lloyd v. Gordon
& Wife, 2 H. and McH. 254 (Md. 1789) where an action for partition was
brought on the law side of the court.
6History discussed: 1 STORY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1877)
§§646-647, citing Speke v. Walrond (1649) as the earliest case.
Baskins v. Krepcik, 153 Neb. 36, 43 N. W. 2d 624 (1950), noted 49 Mich.
L. Rev. 764 (1951).
8Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 509 (1856).
'Roche v. Waters, 72 Md. 264, 19 A. 535 (1890).
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154) of the Maryland Code was enacted."° Though the
statute is merely permissive in form, it is considered to pro-
vide a cotenant of realty an absolute right to a sale for
partition upon a showing that partition in kind cannot be
made "without loss or injury to the parties"." Further-
more the subject case states that the right to a sale for par-
tion is paramount to the interests in remainder of infant
persons.
1 2
At common law partition in kind was limited to present
interests. The right to separate enjoyment was understood
as merely the right to present unhampered physical do-
minion. Section 170 (now 154) in authorizing a sale for
partition provides an alternative means of severing con-
current ownership. 8 The Maryland Court of Appeals has,
however, consistently construed the right to a sale to be
broader in scope than partition in kind and allowed sales
for partition of realty involving future interests. 4 This
resulted in the creation of a situation, not existing thereto-
Dugan and Lyman, Trustees v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore, et al., 70 Md. 1,
6, 16 A. 501 (1889).
" Johnson v. Hoover, 75 Md. 486, 23 A. 903 (1892) ; Kemp v. Waters, 165
Md. 521, 170 A. 178 (1934). Because of this absolute right to sale, the
court could not require that an "upset price" be honored. Though this con-
struction is an extension of the rights of concurrent owners, the courts are
at the same time effectuating the broad public policy in favor of the free
alienability of land,
2Hardy v. Leager, 212 Md. 565, 569, 570, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957). There is
some question whether this is not novel law. As a practical matter, attor-
neys, when seeking to invoke Section 154, include an allegation of "interest
and advantages" to the infant parties - thus anticipating any possible
effect of the third clause of the Section. Accordingly, the question usually
does not arise. See Downin v. Sprecher, 35 Md. 474 (1872). This practice
was not followed in the instant case. However, Dorsey v. Gilbert, et al.,
11 G. & J. 87 (Md. 1839) states that Maryland courts of equity have juris-
diction over the land of infants independently of any of the statutes em-
powering sales. This power is based upon benefit to the infant. It is diffi-
cult to see how it is to the infant's advantage to decree a sale premised
upon a "paramount" right of another. A more equitable position would be
to hold that §167 preempts the matter of sales of future interests and
that advantage to all parties concerned must be shown. In Beggs v. Erb,
138 Md. 345, 113 A. 881 (1921) a case where advantage to the infant parties
but not to possible unborn remaindermen had been shown, the court said
at 353 "And yet it is not perceived why an infant party to the suit should
be any more bound than should those unborn who were parties by repre-
sentation."
1Miy , EQuiy PROCEDuRE (1897) §403 states that sales are in lieu of
partition in kind. See the Dugan case, supra, n. 10, where it was argued
that since partial partitions were not allowed at the common law, a partial
partition by sale could not be decreed under §154.
" Bolgiano v. Cooke, 19 Md. 375, 393 (1863). Under §154 any interest or
estate at law or in equity in possession or remainder may be sold. Billings-
lea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 85 (1865), sale for partition of reversion during
the life tenancy; Downin v. Sprecher, 35 Md. 474 (1872) ; Tolson v. Bryan,
130 Md. 338. 100 A. 366 (1917), owner of an undivided half interest with
life estate in other half interest with remainder over was allowed a sale
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fore, in which the interests of persons not in esse could be
affected by a proceeding in the nature of partition. Since
the problem could not have arisen before the passage of
statutes allowing sales, there was no directly applicable
body of common law. 15 The Maryland case of Downin v.
Sprecher6 is in point. One S.D., a life tenant of a one-sixth
undivided interest in certain realty with remainder over
to her sons "begotten or to be begotten", and her then liv-
ing sons, were defendants in a successful suit brought for
a sale in lieu of partition by the other concurrent owners.
Forty-seven years later S.D.'s surviving sons attacked the
decree in a suit in ejectment. The Court held that the two
sons who were parties to the prior proceeding were bound
but that the three after-born sons were not. In that case
the two basic rules of equity's jurisdiction over the person
came into conflict:
1. No decree respecting property of any persons shall
be made without notice and opportunity to be heard.
2. In order to prevent mutiplicity of suits and to do
complete justice, the decree should embrace a final
settlement of all the rights of all the parties in-
terested. 7
Other American jurisdictions when confronted with
this conflict have evolved a modern case law doctrine of
virtual representation. Two forms of representation are
applicable to the greatest number of cases involving judi-
cial sales: (1) Representation of possible contingent re-
maindermen by a parent life tenant, and (2) representa-
tion of possible after-born contingent remaindermen by
living members of the same class.'" These exceptions to
the general rule of necessary parties are supported on the
principle that human laws (including the rule of neces-
for partition; Bosley v. Burk, 154 Md. 27, 139 A. 543 (1927), complainant
held undivided one-third interest in the fee, life estate in undivided two-
thirds interest. The estate held in the Bosley case was in effect the same
as the interest involved in the present case. MILLER, IOC. cit. 8upra, n. 13,
fn. 1, criticizes this extension.
' SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) §1819. Long v.
Long, 62 Md. 33 (1884) - di8. op. 75, 87. In England sales for partition
were allowed for the first time by 31 and 32 Vict. c. 40 (1868). All American
jurisdictions have some provisions for sale for partition. See, RESTATEMENT
(1948 Supp.), Property, §178, Comm. a, Special Note, for sales statutes of
other jurisdictions.
11 Supra, n. 14.
1" See MILLER, EQUITY PROCEDURE (1897), §20.
's SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra n. 15, §1801 et 8eq. and cases cited.
Roberts, Virtual R presentation in Actions Affecting Future Interest8, 30
Il1. L. Rev. 580 (1936).
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sary parties) are for the living and not for the wishes of
the dead or the possible interests of persons not yet born. 9
Sales for partition prevent waste and inefficiency in the use
of land and favor its free alienability.20 Insecurity of title and
the resultant possibility of litigation by after-born persons
is not in the interests of society. In practice the doctrine of
virtual representation requires the joinder of all living
parties in interest, and further requires that among these
persons there be a living contingent remainderman who
has an identity of estate or a community of interest with
unborn possible remaindermen. Unless their interests are
shown to be adverse to those of the unborn persons, it is
considered that the self-interest of the living persons will
insure that the merits of the cause are before the court.21
Weighing the various interests involved, the courts hold
that it is not unreasonable to require that the unborn per-
sons, upon coming into interest, accept the proceeds from
the sale in lieu of the land itself. The doctrine of virtual
representation is approved by the American Law Institute.2
' Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P. 2d 659, 663 (1942), cert..
den. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Mabry, 317 U. S. 670 (1942).
20Long v. Long, 62 Md. 33 (1884), di8. op. 75, 83-4:
"[I]n 1833, Baltimore County Court had the opportunity to choose
between two courses of action. It could authorize a sale of every in-
terest in the property, and preserve the portions of the purchase money,
to which persons not then in existence might in future contingencies
be entitled; or it might refuse altogether to act, and leave the property
to go to destruction."
See Tolson v. Bryan, 130 Md. 338, 100 A. 366 (1917).
2 SIMESs AND SMIT:, op. cit. supra, n. 15, §1804 and cases cited. Weberpals
v. Jenny, 300 Ii. 145, 133 N. E. 62 (1921).
22 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTy (1936), §§183, 184.
§183:
"A person unborn at the time of the commencement of a judicial
proceeding is duly represented therein by a person duly joined as
a party thereto, when
(a) the person so joined as a party, and the unborn person,
sustain to each other such a relationship that an adequate
presentation of the legal position of the party would be
an adequate presentation of the legal position of the un-
born person; and
(b) the judgment, decree or other result of such proceeding
operates with equal regard for the possible interests of
the person joined as a party and of the unborn person; and
(c) the conduct of the person so joined as a party constitutes
a sufficient protection under the rule stated in §185'."
§184:
"The relationship between the person joined in a judicial pro-
ceeding as a party and the unborn person, which is one of the
prerequisites for effective representation under the rule stated in
§183, exists when the person so joined as a party
(a) is one member of a class in favor of which an interest
in land or other thing is limited in such manner that the
class can increase its membership by the birth of the un-
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During the infancy of this doctrine,23 the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Downin v. Sprecher2 4 rejected both
the rule that a parent life tenant might represent a pos-
sible contingent remaindermen and the rule allowing living
remaindermen to represent unborn members of the same
class. The Court pointed out that the common law prece-
dent for applying the rule of representation by holders of
first estates of inheritance was not applicable to life ten-
ancies.25 The Court took judicial notice of what is pres-
ently Article 16, Section 167, which had been passed after
the sale in question and said, "[a]part from legislative
authority, which was not then given, and the rule of repre-
sentation, which we have decided, does not apply, this
decree had no operation or effect upon the title of these
after-born sons".26
In the subject case the appellee asked the Court to re-
examine the doctrine of virtual representation. Both
clauses (a) and (d) of Section 184 of the Restatement of
Property would apply. However, the Court, citing Downin
v. Sprecher 7 and Long v. Long,2" reasserted its former
holding that the doctrine of virtual representation is not
the law in Maryland. The Court further stated that prior
to the enactment of Section 264 (now 167):
... courts of equity in this State had no jurisdiction
to give to a decree the effect of binding the interests
of parties not then in being, there being no such au-
born person, whether or not the class can decrease its
membership by the death of the person so joined; or
(b) is the person who has the first vested estate of inheritance
in land and the interest limited in favor of the person
unborn becomes possessory, If ever, subsequent to, or in de-
feasance of, the estate of the person so joined; or
(c) is the presumptive taker of an estate of inheritance in
land which although not a vested estate of inheritance, is
so limited that the unborn person may take as the substi-
tute for the person so joined; or
(d) has an estate for life in land and the limitation of the
interests subsequent to such estate for life is in favor of
unborn issue of the person joined; or * * *."
"Faulkner v. Davis, 18 Gratt (Va.) 651, 98 Am. Dec. 698 (1868) is an
example of an early case.
2135 Md. 474 (1872). This is the leading Maryland case.
"The rule of representation by holders of first estates of inheritance is
found in §184(b) of the RESTATEMENT (supra, n. 22). This rule appears
to be the ancestor of the later rule applying to life tenancies as described
in clause (d) of the same section.
Supra, n. 24, 483.
MSupra, n. 24.
262 Md. 33 (1884).
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thority under the general powers of chancery courts
nor by statute.' Miller, Equity Procedure, Section
411; . . ."29
After discussing the Downin ° case the Court goes on to
say:
"Section 264 [now 167] of Article 16 is designed to
meet just the type of situation in which Section 170
[now 154] fell short, as in Downin v. Sprecher, supra,
and the 'benefit of the law embraces almost every
conceivable estate in which unborn children may be
interested.' Miller, Equity Procedure, Sec. 411, and
cases there cited. As said in Ball v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., supra, (92 Md. at 507-8): 'The jurisdiction
of a Court of equity to decree a sale of land under this
Act rests upon the concurrence of two conditions prece-
dent, and they are that all parties in interest and in
being, who would be entitled, if the contingency had
happened at the date of the decree must be parties to
the proceedings, and the sale must be made to appear
to be advantageous to the parties concerned. If these
conditions, as contemplated by the Act, are not com-
plied with, at the date of the decree, the Court will be
without jurisdiction to decree a sale. The language
of the Act is, "'and all such decrees if all the persons
are parties who would be entitled if the contingency
had happened at the date of the decree, shall bind all
persons whether in being or not, who claim any interest
in said land under any of the parties to the decree".' .11
The Court found lack of sufficient proof of advantage and
held that Section 264 (now 167) was not satisfied. It con-
cluded that the possible unborn remaindermen are pro-
tected but not bound by the sale, thus treating the question
as if it had arisen before this statute was enacted.
Therefore, under the present Maryland Law a concur-
rent owner of realty, upon a showing that the land cannot
be divided without loss or injury, is entitled under Section
170 (now 154) as a matter of right to a decree for sale in
lieu of partition, but such sales are subject to the interests
and advantages of after-born persons. Thus, where rights
of unborn persons may be involved the sale must satisfy
the requirements of both Section 170 (now 154) and Sec-
9Hardy v. Leager, 212 Md. 565, 570, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957).
"35 Md. 474 (1872).
' Supra, n. 29, 572. Parenthetical section numbers supplied.
1958]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
tion 264 (now 167) or the title offered at the sale will in
effect be unmerchantable, the sale will bring a lower price,
and all persons in interest will be adversely affected. The
refusal of the Court of Appeals to apply the doctrine of
virtual representation has the effect of restricting this abso-
lute right to partition by sale provided in Section 170 to
cases not involving the possibility of unborn remaindermen.
On the other hand, the enactment of Section 264 (now
167) had as its purpose the protection of all persons in-
volved, both born and unborn, against loss by waste or
deterioration of the property. 2 To accomplish this end it
in substance employs the doctrine of virtual representa-
tion.3" In fact this section is capable of infringing upon the
rights of unborn persons more than the common law doc-
trine. There must be a community of interest with one of
the joined parties for the common law doctrine to operate,
whereas under this Section such community of interest
between a living party and unborn persons is not required,
so long as the sale will be advantageous to the unborn per-
sons. However, the common law doctrine of virtual repre-
sentation should have a place in Maryland law as an ac-
cepted method of getting the issue as to whether the sale
will be advantageous to unborn persons before the court.
The joinder of living members of a class would of necessity
raise the issue of advantage to such persons and thus in-
cidentally to unborn persons of the same class, and any find-
ing of advantage to the unborn persons should be strength-
ened by the fact that the living members of the same class
were joined as defendants. In an admittedly close case such
as was before the Court in Hardy v. Leager 4 the existence
of this community of interest should have been controlling
on the Court of Appeals, where the trial court had found
advantage to all persons concerned.
JOHN D. ALEXANDER, JR.
8 Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382, 389, 29 A. 827 (1894) :
"The purpose of the Legislature in passing it, doubtless, was not
only to protect the interests of those immediately concerned in the
property, but to subserve a broad pullic policy, of preventing, as far
as possible, such estates, as are contemplated 'by the Act, from becom-
ing obstructions to the general progress of the community, in conse-
quence of waste and decay, due to the inefficiency or feebleness of those
having the temporary use or control of them."
8In Beggs v. Erb, 138 Md. 345, 352, 113 A. 881 (1921), the court said:
"The whole theory of the Act of 1862, Ch. 156 ... is that the parties
in ese represent those who are unborn."
This is now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §167.
'212 Md. 565, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957).
